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Abstract: This research suggests a Denial of Service (DoS) detection method based on the 
collection of interdependent behavior data in a sensor network environment. In order to 
collect  the  interdependent  behavior  data,  we  use  a  base  station  to  analyze  traffic  and 
behaviors among nodes and introduce methods of detecting changes in the environment 
with precursor symptoms. The study presents a DoS Detection System based on Global 
Interdependent  Behaviors and shows the result of detecting a sensor carrying out DoS 
attacks through the test-bed. 
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1. Introduction  
The  number  of  security  breaches  is  on  a  sharp  increase  and  so  is  are  the  damage  and  losses. 
Although  the  actual  amount  of  damage  from  malicious  codes  has  not  been  fully  revealed,  it  is 
enormous,  and  such  damage  occurs  from  common  services  such  as  in  cases  of  game  hacking, 
messenger phishing, voice phishing, and so on [1]. Moreover, previous methods of cyber attacks have 
begun to use wireless sensor networks, calling for varied research on protection methods. Particularly, 
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the previous methods of attacks used in wired networks can be applied in the same manner with sensor 
networks. For instance, it is difficult to detect and respond to such an attack due to the mobility of 
wireless network clients and independent operation in an open environment [2]. 
Sensor networks have already been used along with a smartphone, offering various applications in 
fields as diverse as the medical, military, environmental and entertainment services in a multitude of 
areas and, thus, DoS attacks using the environment are likely to cause tremendous damage.  
Therefore,  we  need  to  analyze  cases  of  DoS  attacks  showing  various  patterns  and  develop  a 
detection method to respond to attacks using the sensor networks. Currently, most research on sensor 
network  security  focuses  on  key  distribution  and  management,  authentication,  network  structure, 
routing, and so on, but there is lack of research on precursor symptom detection.  
In this research, therefore, we’ve carried out research on precursor symptom detection to cope with 
DoS attacks in sensor networks. For that reason, we have studied varying vulnerability in an existing 
sensor network and, based on the results, presented an interdependent-based DoS detection system that 
can predict vulnerability. 
In order to verify interdependent behaviors, this research is based on a structure which includes a 
base station and aggregator. Traffic changes and packet data were also analyzed by means of node data 
management.  
2. Basic Research  
A sensor network randomly detects an object in a limited area and sends this information to a base 
station. This means a user is exposed to an environment in which the data are highly likely to become 
redundant or get lost due to the numerous nodes involved.  
Due to its nature, a sensor network is more vulnerable to cyber attacks than a wired network. In 
particular, the open environment makes it more difficult to prevent disclosure of information. As a 
result, one may easily modify data or allow a malicious node to transmit data, destroying the integrity 
of the entire data or causing excessive load on the network. Particularly, in WSNs, nodes are not 
controlled once they have been arranged so that a malicious user may destroy, capture, or compromise 
the nodes [3].   
Common attacks using the wireless network include the capture/compromise of nodes, interception, 
DoS, and router attacks such as HELLO Flood, Sinkhole, Wormhole, and so on. Each type of router 
attack is defined as below: 
▪ Sybil: It causes a node to recognize a single node as a number of identifiers, fatal to geographic 
routing [4].  
▪ Hello Flood: A remote attacker sends a HELLO packet with a strong signal so that a packet can be 
sent to the attacker [5].  
▪ Wormhole:  A  node  connection,  which  does  not  exist, is  recognized,  used  for  interception  or 
selective forwarding [6].  
▪  Sinkholes:  It  is  used  along  with  selective  forwarding  for  interception.  The  routing  data  are 
modified and all the data are induced to pass through the attacker’s sinkhole [7].  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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A cyber attack in the sensor network may develop into the use of one more than one method of 
attack. That is, one may use a wireless jamming attack for DoS or a battery exhaustion attack.  
Attack methods in wireless sensor networks are described as follows:  
▪ Sniffing (Interception) [8]: A sensing data message or signal message in a wireless channel could 
be intercepted or exploited to be analyzed for other attacks.  
▪ Battery exhaustion attack [9]: An attacker causes a battery to be used up in a short time so that 
sensor nodes can not be used anymore. To that end, he may keep requesting data transmission or 
network connections. A PDoS (Path-based DoS) attack, recently analyzed, shows that a huge number 
of bug packets are flooded toward the base station in order to induce fast exhaustion of a battery of 
nodes, reducing the life of the nodes [10].  
▪ Wireless jamming (signal interference) [11]: An attack of jamming a frequency band or paralyzing 
a communication channel by continuously sending a signal. 
▪  Physical  tampering  and  side  channel  attacks  [12]:  Physical  tampering  refers  to  an  attack  of 
destroying or dismantling device hardware while a side channel attack means a method of analyzing 
electric signals from a sensor node or analyzing other signals such as consumption of power. This 
attack is fatal, for it uses an extracted security key, affecting the entire sensor network.  
▪  Routing  attack  [13]:  False  routing  data  could  be  provided  by  a  sensor  network  based  on  a 
broadcast network and then routing protocols fabricated. A routing message received could be spoofed, 
modified, or re-sent, disturbing routing and thus delaying generation or transmission of a routing loop.  
▪ Denial of Service (DoS) in the sensor network [14]: Sensing data services of the sensor network 
are real-time context-aware services and vulnerable to DoS when an attacker disturbs routing or a 
message  attack  delays  processing  and  transmission  time,  making  meaningless  real-time  services. 
Common patterns of attacks include launching attacks on a sensor node or BS by means of various 
methods, blocking transmission of sensing data or causing an error in control signals, which makes 
services impossible to be offered.  
▪ IP Spoofing [15]: An IP-based sensor node or gateway node is an IP-based network so that an 
attacker may disguise himself as an authenticated user of sensor services in order to attack a sensor 
node or network.  
Attacks exploiting vulnerability in protocols or OS include examples such as a Trojan virus, worm, 
malicious code, virus, and so on [16]. 
In an IP-based sensor network or sensor node, an attacker may use a communication channel for an 
IP network or a control channel in a reverse direction so as to distribute vulnerability of OS, a worm, a 
virus, a malicious code, and so on. Using some vulnerability in the OS or protocols, such a virus can 
paralyze sensor nodes, intercept security information of the sensor network, or capture sensor nodes in 
order to develop a bot and, eventually, attack the entire network. 
3. Interdependent Behaviors-Based DoS Detection Method  
3.1. Tracking Behaviors between Sensor Nodes  
The most effective method of identifying a malicious node in the communication between nodes of 
the sensor network is to collect data of nodes communicating with the base station. Before the base Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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station accepts a request from a node, the behavior of a node is analyzed and a malicious node is not 
included in the communication, alleviating DoS attacks. To do so, behaviors between sensor nodes 
shall be tracked. First, it is supposed that all the nodes regularly send data to the base station [17]. 
When a sensor node generates and sends data, looking for a routing path, it specifies the nodes that 
have passed by while a packet header arrives at a target node. Also, a malicious node can be tracked by 
counting a hop node that is generated continuously along the routing path. In this research, we send 
data, collected by constructing an ad-hoc/multi-hop network between application nodes, to a base node 
and analyze them. 
3.2. Traffic Analysis 
We have categorized traffic flowing into a wireless network into several patterns by analyzing the 
data traffic transmitted by nodes. In this research, data traffic between nodes was analyzed by applying 
the DEWP (Detecting Early Worm Propagation through Packet Matching) [18] research, which has 
been presented for DoS detection. This method detects a sudden increase in traffic created by a specific 
node or an abnormal amount of traffic compared to previous traffic generation. For the reason, we 
have compared the amount of packets sent to a specific node during defined time and the amount of 
packets sent out of that node. That is, we used the EWMA (Exponential Weighted Moving Average) 
algorithm in order to compare the amount of packets sent to a specific node during t-time and the 
amount of packets sent out of that node.  
The change in traffic analyzed by the EWMA algorithm is as follows: 
[K′ = α ￗ K′ + (1 − α) ￗ K]  (1)  
where K refers to the number of addresses (sources) of the traffic flowing into a specific node while K′ 
means the average. 
If K > K′ ×  (1 + σ) is satisfied, it means that abnormal traffic has occurred, and the traffic shall be 
blocked; σ refers to the standard deviation α. 
As to global interdependent behaviors, nodes are extracted by studying patterns and mechanism of 
malicious behaviors based on the results of tracking behaviors between nodes and traffic analysis as 
mentioned above. This method has been known to be most effective, for its detection is based on the 
mechanism of a malicious code. A series of behavior rules are compared with interdependent system 
requests  and  the  result  is  used  for  allowing  a  service  or  a  system,  which  is  applied  to  blocking, 
interconnection, engine control, and so on.  
This method applies rules and can detect new patterns based on the previous mechanism but it 
requires constant monitoring for infection between nodes due to host-based detection. 
Figure 1 shows the structure of the DoS detection system based on global interdependent behaviors. 
The  ad-hoc  sensor  network  monitors  data  and  traffic  information  at  each  BS  while  BSM,  which 
monitors BS, analyzes all the data related with behaviors and traffic in order to send them to the rule 
center. Based on the data on the conditions of a node, rules and policies are applied so as to detect an 
abnormal sensor node and report it to a manager as a precursor symptom. Finally, the node manager 
confirms the abnormal sensor and removes it from the ad-hoc network.  
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Figure 1. DoS detection system based on global interdependent behaviors. 
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In this research, five requirements   presented by the requirements of an  effective detection   
system [19] are considered. 
▪ Multiple detection mechanisms  
▪ Attack Coverage 
▪ Granularity of Attack detection  
▪ Consolidation of alarms 
▪ Response Action 
4. Scenario and Implementation of Test-bed 
In this study, a base station and five nodes are used in order to monitor data transmission and traffic 
conditions in a normal environment. The data and traffic are analyzed when a node attempts to keep 
sending a specific message to other nodes. Figure 2 shows the structure of the test-bed. 
Sensor 3 requests sensing data of each sensor per 0.1 second and sends the data to BS. Here, the 
address of the sensor requested is randomly selected among 1, 2, and 4. Also, it requests abnormal data 
(a command that can not be responded) from nodes, causing traffic and load on the entire sensor nodes.  
The total number of nodes is five and BS allows a PC to monitor. Node 1 and Node 2 generate 
traffic per 0.5 second by means of data transmission while Node 4 and 5 generate traffic only there is a Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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change in sensing values, Node 3 requests sensing values from Node 1, 2, and 4 while constantly 
sending data to BS.  
Figure 2. Test-bed environment. 
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4.1. Traffic Analysis Data 
This traffic analysis data makes clear the difference between ordinary sensor node and abnormal 
sensor node when abnormal sensor request malicious messages.  
The number of messages, delivered by each node per minute, for 10 minutes, was counted in order 
to analyze traffic by nodes, which was examined through simulation. Figure 3 shows the value of 
normal message transmission. 
Figure 3. Normal message transmission. 
 
 
Sensor 1 and Sensor 2, which regularly generate nodes, created about 150 messages while Sensor 4 
and  5  created  a  large  number  of  messages  in  the  initial  stage  of  connection  but,  later,  about  10 
messages as the data become stabilized.   
Figure 4 shows that the traffic of Sensor 2, 3, and 4 increases as Sensor 3 makes malicious data 
requests and transmission, creating about 60 messages, which is a 100% increase compared to the Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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previous number of messages. However, Sensor 5, not affected by Sensor 3, sends a message with a 
regular pattern. 
Figure 4. A sudden rise in the number of messages due to the attack from Sensor 3. 
 
4.2. Behavior Data between Nodes  
The  node  for  the  test-bed  is  TIP  700CM  sensor,  which  senses  illumination,  humidity,  and 
temperature with the following message format.  
Table 1. TIP 700CM sensor message format. 
Header Description 
Length (1 byte): message length in bytes not including header 
Fcf (2 byte): IEEE 802.15.4 frame control field [reserved] 
Dsn (1 byte): IEEE 802.15.4 data sequence number [reserved] 
Destpan (2 byte): IEEE 802.15.4 Destination personal area network identifier [reserved] 
Addr (2 byte): TinyOS destination address 
Type(1 byte): TinyOS active message number 
Group (1 byte): TinyOS group id 
Multihop Message Description 
Sourceaddr (2 bytes): address of the previous hop 
Originaddr (2 bytes): address of the origin of the message 
Seqno (2 bytes): sequence number of the previous hop of multihop messages 
Originseqno (2 bytes): sequence number from the origin of multihop messages 
Hopcount (2 bytes): hopcount 
Surge Message Description 
Type (2 bytes): type, type 0 is 'sensor reading' 
Reading (2 bytes): ADC reading from the sensor 
Parentaddr (2 bytes): address of the parent in the multihop tree 
Seq_no (4 bytes): sequence number of Surge messages 
 
The normal data collected through the structure above has the following format depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Sensor data format. 
 
For the analysis of node behaviors, BS verifies the behaviors requested from each sensor and saves 
the data. Figure 6 shows the process of verifying and saving behaviors between nodes. 
Figure 6. Process of verifying behaviors between nodes. 
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According to the result of the test -bed, Sensor 3 keeps requesting/sending data from/to Sensor 1, 2, 
and 4. By confirming messages of a sudden increase, we can detect which node requests a message and 
the ID of the sensor node generating unnecessary traffic.  
Figure 7 shows the result of confirming an abnormal node by collecting data of the sensor nodes. 
Under ‘State’, ‘anomaly_number’ shows which node makes the greatest number of abnormal requests 
and we can see that the node of id 3, ‘anomaly 0’, makes the most frequent message requests and 
generation. The following numbers help to figure out whether or not each sensor makes malicious 
attacks or is being attacked. Therefore, based on this information, the system will report to the network 
manager and remove Sensor 3 from the service so as to monitor changes in other nodes. 
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Figure 7. Detection of an abnormal node by node behaviors analysis. 
 
5. Conclusions  
In  this  research,  we  have  suggested  a  DoS  detection  system  based  on  global  interdependent 
behaviors,  which  analyzes  traffic  and  tracks  node  behaviors  in  a  sensor  network  environment. 
Particularly, in the active sensor network, data traffic is analyzed with BS through message delivery 
patterns among nodes, and node behaviors are tracked by data format analysis. Based on the result, the 
entire data of behaviors are managed and rule information is generated, which helps to examine the 
conditions among nodes.  
Through the test-bed we could detect a node making a malicious attack by discovering message 
behaviors among nodes and comparing message traffic from a sensor attempting a DoS attack. The 
research could be very useful for smart phones which can analyze irregular messages. It can be used to 
confirm unnecessary service connection to check unnecessary information. 
The suggested method of detecting a DoS attack based on interdependent behaviors in the sensor 
network applies the steps required by the requirements of an effective detection system. By doing so, 
the  system  itself  can  block  attacks  to  overcome  a  problem  of  errors  and  can  report  a  precursor 
symptom to a manager to increase the stability of the system. 
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